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THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS  Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2016) 
DECIDING NOT TO DECIDE: A LIMITED DEFENSE OF 
THE SILENT CONCURRENCE 
Alexander I. Platt* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Alito wrote many separate opinions in his first 
decade on the Supreme Court, but one stands apart. It read, in its 
entirety, “Justice Alito concurs in the judgment.”1
This one-liner raised some eyebrows.2 The unexplained 
vote is commonly understood to be the province of the 
legislator; judicial power is customarily exercised through 
reasoned, written opinions.3
While the concurrence without opinion—or silent 
concurrence—is now rarely used on the Supreme Court, it 
*Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Washington, D.C. J.D., Yale Law School. 
Thanks to Yotam Barkai, Sharon Brett, Sean Childers, Brian Soucek, and Stephen 
Williams for comments. All the views expressed in this article, along with any errors, are 
mine alone. Please send comments to alex.i.platt@gmail.com. 
 1. L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. NRDC, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 710, 714 (2013). 
 2. One blogger called it the “the SCOTUS way of communicating, ‘Just saying.’” 
Josh Blackman, Alito, J., Concurring & Just Saying, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 8, 
2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/01/08/alito-j-concurring-just-saying; see also
Kedar S. Bhatia, Concurring or Dissenting Without An Opinion, DAILYWRIT (Jan. 8, 
2013), http:// dailywrit.com/2013/01/concurring-or-dissenting-without-an-opinion (calling 
it a “break from the norm” and noting that “[c]oncurrences . . . without opinion used to be 
fairly common, but in recent years they have become increasingly rare”). 
3. Cf., e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 219, 226 (1999) (“When a governmental official, judge or not, acts contrary to 
what was done on a previous day, without giving reasons, and perhaps for no reason other 
than a change of mind, can the power that is being exercised properly be called ‘judicial’? 
Is it not more like legislative power, which can be exercised whenever the legislator thinks 
best, and without regard to prior decisions?”); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results 
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1371–72 (1995) 
(asserting that judges write “to reinforce [their] oft-challenged and arguably shaky 
authority to tell others—including duly elected political leaders—what to do” and “to 
demonstrate [their] recognition that under a government of laws, ordinary people have a 
right to expect that the law will apply to all citizens alike”). 
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142 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
remains a steady feature on the federal courts of appeals.4 And 
yet, it is widely regarded as illegitimate. It has been criticized as 
“perplexing,”5 “an abomination,”6 “unnecessary,”7 “trouble-
provoking,”8 and “condemnable,”9 accused of “thwart[ing] the 
judicial process,”10 of offering “little value”11 or none at all,12
and condemned as a practice that “cannot be justified as 
appropriate judicial methodology,”13 and must be “eradicated”14
or “abandon[ed].”15
These attacks are overstated. Silent concurrences are a 
legitimate technique of “negative judicial agenda-setting.”16 As 
when a judge chooses not to reach every issue presented or to 
resolve a case with an unpublished disposition, the silent 
concurrence allows judges to decide not to decide, permitting 
reallocation of judicial time towards other cases that might 
improve the overall quality of decisionmaking. Critics are not 
wrong to point out problems with the silent concurrence, but 
these flaws are shared by other negative agenda-setting practices 
that are broadly regarded as legitimate.17 The cost/benefit ratio is 
4. See infra Part II. 
 5. Ira P. Robbins, Concurring in the Result Without Written Opinion: A Condemnable 
Practice, 84 JUDICATURE 118, 118 (2000). 
 6. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 152 (3d ed. 2012) (“[T]he naked 
statement ‘I concur in the result.’. . . is the kind of thing that prompts the young to scoff, 
‘Big deal!’ I scoff at the ‘concurrence in the result’ practice as an abomination. What is 
being served? Very little, except, perhaps—to use the vernacular again—an ego trip.”). 
 7. PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 19 (2010); see also Ryan M. Moore, Comment, I Concur! Do I Matter? 
Developing a Framework for Determining the Precedential Influence of Concurring 
Opinions, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. 743, 752 (2012). 
 8. Richard B. Cappalli, What is Authority? Creation and Use of Case Law by 
Pennsylvania’s Appellate Courts, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 303, 331 (1999). 
9. See generally Robbins, supra note 5.
 10. Id. at 162.
 11. Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion 
Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 301 (2008). 
 12. Moore, supra note 7, at 760 (“Where no opinion exists to cite to, the issue of 
precedential influence is without value.”).
 13. Cappalli, supra note 8, at 325.
 14. Id. at 331 (recommending that Pennsylvania appellate courts “eradicate[] the 
deeply rooted, but trouble-provoking, silent concurrence”).
 15. Robbins, supra note 5, at 164.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 38–55 (discussing varieties of negative judicial 
agenda-setting).
17. See infra Part III. 
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SILENT CONCURRENCES 143
not apparently worse for silent concurrences than for these other 
practices. Calls for abolition, therefore, seem to be unjustified. 
This article draws on an original dataset of all silent 
concurrences in the federal courts of appeals from 1997 to 
201418 and proceeds in two parts. Part II reports on patterns of 
contemporary usage of silent concurrences. Part III argues that 
silent concurrences are a legitimate technique of negative 
judicial agenda-setting. 
II. SILENT CONCURRENCES: AN OVERVIEW19
Dissents and concurrences without opinion date back to the 
early Supreme Court, with the Marshall Court (1801–1835) 
recording forty-one separate opinions without opinion.20 The 
practice became more prevalent, with the Taney Court (1836–
1864) registering 389.21 But, by the late twentieth century, the 
Court had moved away from the practice. Between 1986 and 
1989, the Rehnquist Court produced just nine silent 
concurrences.22 And by 2013 the silent concurrence had become 
 18. See Alexander I. Platt, Silent Concurrence Dataset (2016) (containing statistics on 
silent concurrences in the federal courts of appeals) (on file with author). The methodology 
used to assemble the dataset is reported in Appendix A, infra p. 163, and the cases included 
in it are listed in Appendix B, infra pp. 164–75. 
 19. This article’s focus is on the federal courts of appeals, but some state appellate 
courts also use the technique frequently. A 2000 survey found that it was used regularly in 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and 
that Alabama, Mississippi and Pennsylvania demonstrated a “remarkably high incidence” 
of the practice. Robbins, supra note 5, at 118. Use in Pennsylvania has been particularly 
broad: From 1966 through early 1999, its appellate courts used silent concurrences over 
600 times. Cappalli, supra note 8, at 331 n.203. 
 20. The first recorded dissent without opinion in the Supreme Court was Herbert v. 
Wren, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 370, 382 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also John P. Kelsh, 
The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790–1945, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 137, 148 n.65 (1999) (citing Herbert).
 21. Kelsh, supra note 20, at 158. 
 22. CORLEY, supra note 7, at 32; see DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 155 (1989) 
(White, J., concurring); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in result); INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 887 (1988) (same); 
Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 590 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fl. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 588 
(1988) (Scalia & O’Connor, JJ., concurring); Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 
485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Comm’r v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 100 
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in result); Bd. Of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of 
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144 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
rare enough that Justice Alito’s use of the technique provoked a 
startled reaction.23
Yet the practice lives on in the federal courts of appeals. 
Between 1997 and 2014,24 an average of about twelve published 
cases per year (approximately 0.25 percent25) have included 
silent concurrences.26 There is considerable circuit variation: 
The First Circuit never uses the silent concurrence; the Second, 
Third, and Seventh rarely do; and the Fifth and Eleventh use it 
most often.27
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 550 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Moore, supra note 7, at 
760 n.135.  
 23. See supra note 2. 
 24. Data in all tables is from fiscal years 1997 through 2014. “Fiscal year” in this 
context means the twelve-month period ending in September 30 of the named year. See
Appendix A, infra page 163. 
 25. See Table 2, infra page 145. 
 26. See Table 1. 
 27. See Tables 3 and 4, infra pages 145, 147. 
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SILENT CONCURRENCES 145
Table 2 
Silent-Concurrence Rates in the Federal Courts of Appeals
Neither senior nor visiting judges use silent concurrences at 
a higher rate than active judges.28 But the practices of individual 
judges vary widely. One judge on the D.C. Circuit is responsible 
for almost eighty percent of that court’s silent concurrences.29 In 
 28. See Tables 6 and 7, infra page 148. 
29. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 751 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 663 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); St. Marks Place Housing 
Co., Inc. v. HUD, 610 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (same); U.S. v. Palmera Pineda, 592 F.3d 
199 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (same); In re Subpoena in Collins, 524 F.3d 249 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(same); U.S. v. Gabriel, 365 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same), vacated & remanded, 543 
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Table 3 
Silent Concurrences by Circuit
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the Eleventh Circuit, one judge is responsible for sixty percent;30
and in the Second Circuit, fifty.31
Judges can issue both “swing” and “non-swing” silent 
concurrences.32 A swing silent concurrence provides a critical 
vote for the majority result (even as it withholds support for the 
opinion), while a non-swing silent concurrence is merely the 
third vote on a panel whose other two judges embrace the 
majority opinion in full. The overwhelming majority of silent 
concurrences in the federal courts of appeals are non-swing.33
U.S. 1101 (2005); Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(Henderson, J., concurring in result). Just two other judges on the D.C. Circuit issued silent 
concurrences during the relevant period. Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (Brown, J., concurring in judgment); Stop this Insanity Inc. Emp. Leadership 
Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Sentelle, J., concurring in judgment). 
30. See Cave v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrections, 638 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(Edmonson, J., concurring in judgment); Leal v. Sec’y, HHS, 620 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 
2010) (Edmonson, J., concurring in result); DeYoung v. Schofield, 609 F.3d 1260 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (Edmonson, J., concurring in judgment); Green v. DEA, 606 F.3d 1296 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (Edmonson, J., concurring in result); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 
2010) (same); Parker v. Allen, 565 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009) (Edmonson, C.J., concurring 
in result); Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (same); 
Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008) (Edmonson, C.J., concurring); 
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. 494 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Epps v. Watson, 492 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(same); U.S. v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006) (same);  U.S. v. Dulcio, 441 F.3d 
1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); In re Conklin, 416 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Tello 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); U.S. v. Crawford, 
407 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964 
(11th Cir. 2005) (same); Seay Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Mary Esther, Fla., 397 
F.3d 943 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Carr v. Schofield, 364 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(same); Williams v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. 373 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2004) (same); 
Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cnty., Fla, 337 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 
2003) (same); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (same); U.S. v. 
Kapelshnik, 306 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); U.S. v. Humber, 255 F.3d 1308 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (Edmonson, J., concurring in result); Culpepper v. Irwin Mortg. Corp., 253 F.3d 
1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (Edmonson, J., concurring in judgment); U.S. v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 
1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (Edmonson, J., concurring in result); U.S. v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888 
(11th Cir. 2001) ((Edmonson, J., concurring in judgment only); Llampallas v. Mini-
Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998) (Edmonson, J., concurring in result).  
 31. U.S. v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in 
result); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 2000) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in 
result); see also Table 5, infra page 147. 
32. See generally, e.g., Robbins, supra note 5 (discussing silent concurrences that 
function as swing votes).
 33. See Table 8, infra page 149. 
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Table 4 
Rate of Silent Concurrences by Circuit
Table 5 
Silent-Concurrence Concentration by Circuit34
 34. There was only one silent concurrence in the Third Circuit, so that judge accounted 
for 100 percent of the Third Circuit’s total. In the Sixth Circuit, two judges issued the same 
peak number of silent concurrences: three. 
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Table 6 
Silent Concurrences by Federal Judge Status
Table 7 
Total Cases Heard by Federal Judge Status
157
40
12
Active
Senior
Visiting
1,236,296
289,456
82,220
Active
Senior
Visiting
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Table 8 
Silent Concurrence Type: Federal Courts of Appeals
III. SILENT CONCURRENCES AS JUDICIAL AGENDA-SETTING
The quality of judicial decisionmaking is, in part, a 
function of judicial time: At least up to a certain point, the more 
time, the better the decision.  But judicial time is a scarce 
resource. More time devoted to one case means less for 
another.35 Difficult cases might well deserve more judicial time 
 35. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 186–87 (1998); see also Wald, supra note 3, at 1374 (“Time does 
not allow for the same careful, thoughtful analysis and writing to be poured into all 
cases.”); David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over 
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1695 (2005) (asserting that “[t]he 
enormity of appellate caseloads precludes judges from giving each case the sort of 
individualized attention that we presume is the hallmark of appellate justice”). It is 
unsurprising—but unfortunate—to find fundamental errors cropping up in unpublished 
dispositions. See, e.g., Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
153 (2013) (discussing repeated copying and pasting of passages from one unpublished 
opinion into others); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, 
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
273, 284 (1996) (maintaining that “[i]t should come as no surprise that unpublished 
opinions are . . . dreadful in quality”); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals 
Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 95 (2004) (noting 
200
9
NonͲSwing
Swing
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than easy ones,36 but an hour spent further refining the prose of a 
well-worked opinion might be better spent screening for basic 
errors in other cases.37
Though many key allocational issues are resolved by the 
other branches,38 the federal appellate judiciary retains 
expansive negative agenda-setting power—that is, power to 
keep issues off the decisional menu.39 In every appeal, judges 
must not only resolve the legal and factual issues presented, but 
also the antecedent question: which of the issues presented will 
be decided. This negative agenda-setting power allows judges to 
problems that arise when judges “fail to scrutinize the language of the unpublished decision 
because it is unpublished, and . . . [they] don’t want to take the time to polish the product” 
(quoting correspondence from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit)).
 36. Even critics of unpublished dispositions must acknowledge as much. Arnold, supra 
note 3, at 223 (“[G]iven the shortness of human life, judges’ time would be better spent on 
hard cases than on tedious explanations of the easy ones.”).
37. See generally Soucek, supra note 35 (discussing the process by which errors can 
spread through copying from one unpublished opinion into others).
 38. Federal law sets the number of judicial hours available in the federal courts of 
appeals by requiring three judges to sit on each panel, 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2015), setting the 
numbers of judges in each circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2015), and making rules about senior 
status, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2015). And, of course, federal law also affects the number 
of appeals filed by constantly creating or removing causes of action and appellate rights. 
Similarly, the President and Senate affect the number of judicial hours available by 
nominating and confirming judges—or declining to do so. See, e.g., Judicial Emergencies,
U.S. CTS. (June 22, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/ 
judicial-emergencies (listing long-unfilled circuit-judge vacancies in courts with more than 
700 annual filings per panel).  
39. Negative agenda-setting is contrasted with positive agenda-setting—the power to 
add items to the decisional menu. Examples of positive judicial agenda-setting include 
voting in favor of certiorari, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA 
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); signaling the likely decision in 
a future case as a method of inviting or discouraging such cases, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The
Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 
(2008); reaching issues not presented by the parties, Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding 
Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 689–91
(2012) (pointing out that Supreme Court “reformulates the questions presented . . . 
sometimes exceeds the boundaries of the questions presented,” and “injects questions, even 
constitutional ones that no litigant sought to raise”); Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity and 
Agenda Setting on the Warren Court, 52 POL. RES. Q. 39 (1999) (same); Kevin T. McGuire 
& Barbara Palmer, Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court, 90 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1996) (same); but see Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Timothy 
Johnson, The Claim of Issue Creation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
845 (1996) (challenging the McGuire/Palmer findings); and voting to hear cases en banc, 
Michael W. Giles, Thomas G. Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting a Judicial Agenda: The 
Decision to Grant En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 68 J. POL. 852 (2006).
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SILENT CONCURRENCES 151
avoid expending time on a particular issue or case, preserving 
their time to be reallocated to other judicial work.40
Appellate judges engage in negative agenda-setting through 
various practices and doctrines.41 They frequently exercise 
discretion not to resolve every issue presented—a technique 
some refer to as “issue suppression.”42 Courts may choose to 
reach only those issues necessary to resolve the appeal and upon 
which they can secure a majority (or unanimity), even when this 
means leaving unaddressed other relevant and important issues 
that had been properly raised by the parties.43 No formal 
doctrine or rule requires this, and it is often left unexplained. 
Another example of negative agenda-setting is judges’ use 
of unpublished dispositions, which range from totally 
conclusory dispositions with no analysis to relatively elaborate 
(but still unprecedential) opinions.44 The majority of cases in the 
federal courts of appeals are now resolved with unpublished 
orders, opinions, or dispositions, rather than published 
40. E.g., Wasby, supra note 35, at 91 (“Judges devote more attention to some cases 
than to others because they feel that it is in the interests of the legal system as a whole for 
them to do so.”). One appellate judge described one technique of judicial agenda-setting as 
“a pressure valve in the system, a way to pan for judicial gold while throwing the less 
influential opinions back into the stream.” Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished 
Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178 (1999). Other functions and purposes served by 
negative judicial agenda-setting, including those that are ideological and strategic, are 
discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 74–77. 
 41. These examples contradict the belief, widely held among political scientists, that 
lower federal courts do not exercise any meaningful control over their own agendas. Thus, 
in political-science evaluation of appellate courts, “agenda setting has assumed a less 
central position, reflecting the lack of control that courts typically exercise over the cases 
they hear,” because “[u]nlike most other political institutions, courts are generally reactive 
in nature and typically must wait for a party to introduce an issue in the form of a lawsuit.” 
Giles et al., supra note 39, at 852. Of course political scientists do recognize that the 
Supreme Court remains an “exception to the judiciary’s lack of agenda control,” because it 
can “set[] its own agenda through the grant or denial of certiorari.” Id. And so, “the study 
of agenda setting in the field of judicial politics has focused almost entirely on the Supreme 
Court and the certiorari decision.” Id.
 42. Palmer, supra note 39, at 40 (crediting the term to Sidney Ulmer). 
43. See id. at 44 (finding issue suppression in more than half of a random sample of 
200 cases from the Warren Court); McGuire & Palmer, supra note 39, at 693 (finding issue 
suppression in almost half of the cases in OT 1988); see also Monaghan, supra note 39, at 
705–07 (noting that Supreme Court sometimes reaches issues not considered by the courts 
below, as if doing so were a “a matter of discretion,” and sometimes acts sua sponte or 
bases its decisions on “legislative facts . . . that have not been subject to challenge in the 
adversarial process”). 
 44. E.g., Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 35, at 160. 
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opinions.45 And because judges typically devote substantially 
less time and effort to drafting and reviewing these unpublished 
dispositions than to drafting and reviewing their to-be-published 
opinions,46  the decision to resolve a given case this way leaves 
judges with more time to spend elsewhere. 47
Like the decision not to reach every issue presented, the 
decision to resolve a case by unpublished order is almost never 
publicly explained.48 Circuit rules seek to guide decisions about 
publication,49 but these rules are malleable.50 The typical 
 45. See Table 9, infra page 153. 
 46. Wald, supra note 3, at 1373 (noting that “for the most part, law clerks, not judges, 
draft them,” and that most “are turned out within hours or days of argument or 
conference”); Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t 
Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. L. 43, 43–44 (June 2000) (explaining 
that “writing an opinion is much harder” than writing an unpublished disposition, noting 
that “[m]ost” of the latter “are drafted by law clerks with relatively few edits from the 
judges,” and that “[f]ully 40 percent of our memodispos are in screening cases, which are 
prepared by our central staff”); Wasby, supra note 35, at 81, 93 (pointing out that “[o]n the 
whole, unpublished dispositions are shorter and less developed than published opinions,” 
and that “[a] principal justification for unpublished rulings, which judges well understand, 
is that preparing one takes less effort than preparing a published opinion”). 
47. See Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 35 (characterizing the use of unpublished 
dispositions as a form of “judicial triage”); Wasby, supra note 35, at 67 (same); but see 
generally Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 35 (suggesting that courts may use unpublished 
dispositions to avoid expending time and effort on the most difficult cases, where that time 
should be spent).
 48. Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 35, at 1764 (describing the use of unpublished 
dispositions as a “‘black box’ process that is all but invisible to outsiders”). 
 49. For instance, the local rules of the D.C. Circuit provide that a case may be resolved 
through an unpublished disposition unless it is a case of first impression involving a 
substantial issue or the first case to present it to the court; alters, modifies, or significantly 
clarifies a rule of law previously announced by the court; calls attention to an existing rule 
of law that appears to have been generally overlooked; criticizes or questions existing law; 
resolves an apparent conflict in decisions within the circuit or creates a conflict with 
another circuit; reverses a published decision, or affirms a decision on grounds different 
from those set forth in the district court’s published opinion; or warrants publication in 
light of other factors that give it general public interest. D.C. Cir. R. 36 (U.S. Ct. of App. 
for the D.C. Cir., Ct. Rs. & Operating Procedures, through June 1, 2015). Some circuit 
rules strongly favor publication, and articulate procedures and rules governing the decision 
not to publish. E.g. 1st Cir. R. 36(2)(B) (June 1, 2016) (“[S]hould any judge remain of the 
view that the opinion should be published, it must be.”). 
 50. Wald, supra note 3, at 1374 (“[I]n my experience the criteria are vague and 
infinitely maneuverable.”); see also Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith & Reginald S. 
Sheehan, Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 963, 975 (1989) (concluding that “publication of opinions in the Eleventh Circuit is 
much more subjective than the circuit courts would have us believe”); Donald R. Songer, 
Criteria For Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus 
Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 313–14 (1990) (noting that “a number of 
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unpublished disposition contains a bare citation to the rule 
authorizing non-publication, and no explanation as to how or 
why the case qualified for treatment under the rule. 
There are many other examples of negative judicial agenda-
setting. Justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, ripeness, 
political-question doctrine, and abstention allow courts to avoid 
resolving the merits of a dispute.51 Waiver and forfeiture 
doctrines allow courts to avoid ruling on issues not adequately 
presented or preserved.52 And judges may avoid definitive 
judges . . . are in practice applying different standards from the official criteria” and that 
“there may be considerable variation among judges (even in the same circuit) in their 
operational definitions of what constitutes a decision that is worthy of publication”);
Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 35, at 1703–05 (raising questions about which sorts of cases 
are routed to no-argument tracks); Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 35, at 161, 165–66 
(acknowledging that “the behavior of judges is primarily governed by internally generated 
norms that can be altogether different from the officially stated organizational rules” 
regarding publication, and discussing the lack of adequate external monitoring regarding 
the publication rules (citations omitted)); but see Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. 
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001) (finding that at least some of the variables 
associated with nonpublication “track[ed] formal publication rules”). 
51. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 39, at 707–11; LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES 
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL &
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 39 (2013). 
 52. Monaghan, supra note 39, at 693–99. 
Table 9 
Publication Rates in the Federal Courts of Appeals
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resolution of legal issues by deliberately drafting vague opinions 
that avoid stating clear rules to guide future cases.53 Through 
these agenda-setting practices (and others54), appellate judges 
limit the time they spend on particular cases, creating pools of 
surplus time that can be drawn down elsewhere.55
Silent concurrences ought to be evaluated alongside other 
instruments of negative judicial agenda-setting. A federal 
appellate judge with doubts about an opinion by a colleague 
(particularly an opinion that has already attracted a second 
vote56) may dispense with the otherwise time-consuming 
process of trying to resolve those doubts while drafting a 
concurring or dissenting opinion, and instead issue a silent 
concurrence. This leaves the doubting judge with surplus time to 
allocate to other opinions.57
53. E.g., Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, 
Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504, 505 (2008) (“[C]ontrol over 
opinion clarity presents judges with a tradeoff between managing their uncertainty and 
institutional prestige on the one hand and their control over policy outcomes on the 
other.”).
54. E.g., Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 35, at 159 (referring to “shortcuts” that 
“include the denial of oral argument, judicial encouragement to settle or use alternative 
methods of dispute resolution, the extensive use of staff attorneys and law clerks in the 
decisionmaking process, and the use of short-form dispositions in place of published 
opinions” (footnote omitted)). 
 55. This is far from the only important purpose served by these negative agenda-setting 
practices. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (“The 
statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient 
of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain 
times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.”); 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (describing abstention as “fundamental not only 
to our federal system but also to the basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National 
Government under our Constitution”).  
 56. A judge issuing a silent concurrence must have enough confidence in the result—
affirmance, reversal, remand—reached by the majority to vote for it. But non-swing silent 
concurrences require a weaker degree of bottom-line agreement than do swing silent 
concurrences; once the writing judge’s opinion has attracted a second vote, the third vote is 
dispensable.
 57. The non-swing silent concurrence could be viewed as the modern version of the 
dubitante opinion. See generally Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 1 (2006) (quoting example from dictionary definition: “the judge doubted a legal 
point but was unwilling to state that it was wrong” (footnote omitted)). The dubitante 
opinion is endangered, but not extinct. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, 7th Circuit Judge 
Writes One-Sentence “Maybe” Concurrence; Was it a “Dubitante” Opinion? ABA J. 
DAILY NEWS (Jun. 3, 2015 5:45 a.m. CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/7th_ 
circuit_judge_writes_one_sentence_maybe_concurrence_was_it_a_dubitante. The silent 
concurrence could also be viewed as a partial implementation of the two-judge-panel 
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Statistical analysis of the dataset presented above—
encompassing all silent concurrences in the federal courts of 
appeals from 1997 to 2014—is consistent with this view. 
Federal appellate judges are more likely to issue silent 
concurrences when they have more judicial work to attend to.58
Higher average workload59 by circuit correlates at a statistically 
significant level with the average rate of silent concurrences.60
Table 10 
Silent Concurrences and Workload—Federal Courts of Appeals61
The D.C. Circuit is an outlier in this analysis, with the 
lowest workload figure,62 but a moderately high level of silent 
proposal floated to solve the perceived crisis of appellate volume in the 1990s. THOMAS E.
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS 172–73 (1994) (“In the run of federal appeals, two judges would be sufficient, if 
they agreed, and a third could be brought in to break the tie only when the two could not 
agree.”).
58. See Robbins, supra note 5, at 160 (speculating that judges might use silent 
concurrences because “their dockets are large and unmanageable,” and that “overworked 
judges may be using [silent concurrences] simply as a technique to avoid spending time 
articulating disagreement with the majority’s or plurality’s rationale”).
 59. “Workload” is terminations per active judge. See Appendix A, infra page 163. 
 60. See Table 10. 
 61. Correlation coefficient = .70. R2 = 0.49. P = 0.01. 
 62. Because complex regulatory cases dominate the D.C. Circuit docket, it may not have 
the lowest actual workload. E.g., Russell Wheeler, Federal Judicial Nominations: Skunky 
D.C. Stats, Justified Ideological Nominations, Vacancies Without Nominees, BROOKINGS 
FIXGOV (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:15 p.m.), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/ 
11/4-federal-judicial-nominations-dc-stats-vacancies-wheeler (criticizing “slightly adjusted 
raw filings . . . used as a guideline to inform the . . . assessment of appellate court judgeship 
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156 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
concurrences. However, as discussed earlier, just one D.C. 
Circuit judge is responsible for eighty percent of that court’s 
silent concurrences.63 Removing this outlier judge from the 
calculation enhances the explanatory power of workload.64 The 
Eleventh and Second Circuits also have judges who account for 
at least half of their silent concurrences.65 Removing all three 
outlier judges from the calculation still yields a significant 
correlation between workload and silent concurrences.66
The correlation between workload and silent concurrences 
is similar to the correlation between workload and the rate of 
unpublished opinions, which have been similarly justified as a 
technique to allocate scarce judicial time.67 (Average workload 
by circuit is also positively correlated with the average rate of 
resolving cases via unpublished dispositions and opinions.68)
Thus, empirical evidence from the federal courts of appeals 
is consistent with the hypothesis that silent concurrences are 
used by judges as a negative agenda-setting technique. Judges 
with heavier demands on their time have greater need for time-
saving devices like silent concurrences and unpublished 
dispositions, and make greater use of them. 
need,” but acknowledging that “developing valid comparative workload measures is a 
challenge”).
63. See note 29, supra, and accompanying text.
 64. See Table 11, infra page 157. 
 65. See notes 30–31, supra, and accompanying text.  
 66. See Table 12, infra page 157. Workload can only go so far as an explanation. The 
two circuits with the highest uncorrected rates of silent concurrences are the Fifth and 
Eleventh, which used to be the same court, suggesting that circuit norms may play an 
important role. Cf. Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual 
Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 875 (1998) (tracing the rise of 
separate opinion writing on the Supreme Court to the decline of “consensual norms” that 
“disappeared almost overnight” upon the appointment of Chief Justice Stone in 1941). It 
also raises the possibility that a common factor unique to the dockets of the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits might explain the phenomenon. 
67. E.g., Martin, supra note 40, at 183 (“What would happen if . . . we were forced to 
publish all our opinions? We would likely see an across-the-board lessening of quality, 
because judicial resources would be stretched even further, and we would see scores of 
remarkably brief and uninformative, but nonetheless ‘published,’ opinions.”).
 68. See Table 13, infra page 158. 
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Table 11 
Silent Concurrences and Workload—D.C. Circuit Outlier* Omitted
Table 12 
Silent Concurrences and Workload—All Outliers* Omitted
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Table 13 
Nonpublication and Workload—Federal Courts of Appeals69
The lead criticism of silent concurrences is that they 
“produce[] instability in the law as lawyers, courts, and 
commentators attempt to evaluate the case’s precedential 
value.”70 Critics argue that a silent concurrence “produces all the 
evils of a concurring opinion with none of its values” because it 
“casts doubt on the principles declared in the main opinion 
without indicating why they are wrong or questionable.”71
But virtually all techniques of judicial agenda-setting 
similarly preserve uncertainty. A decision not to reach an issue, 
to resolve it by unpublished opinion, or to decide the case on 
jurisdictional grounds could mean that the underlying issue will 
have to be briefed again and then decided by some future panel 
of judges. Moreover, the same “uncertainty” criticism could be 
leveled at all separate opinions.72 And there is a long-running 
 69. Correlation coefficient = .66, R2 = .43, P = .02. 
 70. Robbins, supra note 5, at 118.
 71. BERNARD E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 223 (1977)
[hereinafter WITKIN MANUAL]; see also Bernard E. Witkin, Appellate Court Opinions: A 
Syllabus for a Panel Discussion at the Appellate Judges Conference, SEMINARS FOR 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES, 63 F.R.D. 515, 584 (1972) (“Is barebones concurrence a proper 
exercise of the judicial function, or is an appellate judge under a duty to concur fully or 
specially with reasons?” (emphasis original)); Moore, supra note 7, at 760.   
72. James F. Spriggs & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. 
Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1105 (2001) (“[C]ases with a larger number of 
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school of thought that preservation of uncertainty is a laudable 
goal for the judiciary, at least in some contexts.73 Attacks on 
silent concurrences for perpetuating uncertainty do not seem 
compelling. 
Silent concurrences may be deployed for less lofty 
purposes than those ascribed to them here. For instance, a silent 
concurrence might be used to maximize judicial leisure rather 
than to allocate a judge’s time to other decisions. Or it might 
reflect a merely stylistic disagreement, rather than substantive 
doubts.74 But other agenda-setting devices may be subject to 
similar misuse. A judge who understands that his preferred view 
on the merits is unlikely to be accepted by either of his co-
panelists may be inclined to press for the case to be decided on 
jurisdictional grounds.75 A judge eying elevation to a higher 
court may be inclined to avoid a controversial issue as 
“unnecessary” to the appeal.76 And a panel that prefers a certain 
result but finds the case a poor vehicle for a full exposition can 
achieve that result through an unpublished disposition.77
concurring opinions are more likely to be overruled”); see also CORLEY, supra note 7, at 
10.
73. See generally, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
74. See WITKIN MANUAL, supra note 71, at 223 (also suggesting that silent 
concurrences should be used “sparingly”); CORLEY, supra note 7, at 19 (indicating that 
“one is left to speculate regarding the possible reason” behind a silent concurrence).  In 
some cases, it may be possible to guess the motivation of the silently concurring judge 
from the majority opinion. E.g., U.S. v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(Henderson, J.) (opening majority opinion affirming a criminal conviction and sentence by 
quoting novelist George Eliot: “The law’s made to take care o’ raskills.”); id. (Tatel, J., 
concurring silently). 
 75. On standing’s malleability, see Monaghan, supra note 39, at 679, and Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics? 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999). 
76. Cf. Wald, supra note 3, at 1378 (“If alternative rationales are available to support a 
result, the one that can garner a majority of judges will be chosen, even if it is not the 
writer’s preferred one.”).
 77. One critique of unpublished dispositions offered the following hypothetical 
examples of abuse: 
If, for example, a precedent is cited, and the other side then offers a distinction, 
and the judges on the panel cannot think of a good answer to the distinction, but 
nevertheless, for some extraneous reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do so 
through the device of an abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever 
be the wiser. . . . Or if, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that 
a certain decision should be reached, but also believes that the decision is hard to 
justify under the law, he or she can achieve that result, assuming agreement with 
other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and 
sweeping the difficulties under the rug. 
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It might be argued that silent concurrences are subject to 
manipulation because they require no reasoned explanation, so 
judges using them are unaccountable to any sort of external 
control. But this is not unique to the silent concurrence. The 
exercise of discretion not to resolve every issue in a case is 
rarely accompanied by any explanation of why the court decided 
not to decide the excepted issues.78 The same is true for the use 
of unpublished dispositions.79
Critics might argue that silent concurrences are more 
subject to inappropriate use than other negative agenda-setting 
practices because they are exercised unilaterally. But 
unilateralism is a feature, not a bug: A silent concurrence does 
not deprive the parties (or the legal system) of anything except 
the opinion of the single judge who deploys it. The majority 
opinion, fully reasoned and published, is binding on the parties 
and on future panels. 
Critics might also argue that the proliferation of silent 
concurrences diminishes the quality of judicial decisionmaking 
because silent judges lose the opportunity of fully exploring 
alternate bases for decision that might reveal themselves during 
the process of writing full concurring opinions,80 and majority 
Arnold, supra note 3, at 223; see also Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 35, at 1689 
(concluding that “judges are intentionally choosing to duck some inconvenient issues” 
through unpublished dispositions); Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 35 (same); Wald, supra 
note 3, at 1374 (“I have seen judges purposefully compromise on an unpublished decision 
incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming public debate 
about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with a result 
they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent.”).
For a discussion of these doctrines as related to judicial leisure preference, see 
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 51, at 38–41. 
78. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 80. Many judges have explained that the process of actually writing an opinion leads to 
greater clarity of analysis, and sometimes even changes in their views. For instance, Judge 
Wald explained that 
[e]ven when judges agree on a proposed result after reading briefs and hearing 
argument, the true test comes when the writing judge reasons it out on paper (or 
on computer). That process, more than the vote at conference or the courtroom 
dialogue, puts the writer on the line, reminds her with each tap of the key that 
she will be held responsible for the logic and persuasiveness of the reasoning 
and its implications for the larger body of circuit and national law. . . . It is not 
so unusual to modulate, transfer, or even switch an originally intended rationale 
or result in midstream because “it just won’t write.” 
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authors lose out on the possibility of learning from criticisms 
advanced by concurring judges’ opinions.81 But the author of an 
unpublished summary disposition might similarly benefit from 
both the discipline of writing a full exposition and the scrutiny 
that accompanies publication.82 Moreover, the availability of 
silent concurrences (like that of unpublished opinions) also 
arguably enhances the overall quality of judicial opinion writing 
by giving judges more control over how to allocate their time 
among cases and by allowing them to record a vote that more 
accurately reflects a doubtful position when they hold one. 
Silent concurrences also provide an informational benefit 
by allowing judges to cast votes that more accurately reflect 
their doubts. Without the ability to use a silent concurrence, a 
doubting judge would be pressured either to vote in favor of the 
opinion or to write separately. But a doubting judge may not be 
confident enough in the reasoning behind those doubts to 
register them in a separate opinion. Without the option of silent 
concurrences, the doubly doubting judge might simply vote with 
the majority. 
Some critics claim that silent concurrences violate litigants’ 
right to a fully reasoned explanation of the judicial decision.83
But similar criticism might be launched against other judicial 
agenda-setting practices.84 Unpublished dispositions do not fully 
explain to the parties why their cases were not entitled to full 
Wald, supra note 3, at 1374–75; see also BAKER, supra note 57, at 173 (surveying 
criticisms of two-judge proposal, and noting “disadvantages” of the two-judge panel, 
including the risk that “one fewer perspective might diminish the quality of the particular 
decision or the overall quality of decisionmaking”). 
81. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. S. CT. HIST. 33, 41 (1994) 
(“The dissent or concurrence puts my opinion to the test, providing a direct confrontation 
of the best arguments on both sides of the disputed points. It is a sure cure for laziness, 
compelling me to make the most of my case. Ironic as it may seem, I think a higher 
percentage of the worst opinions of my Court—not in result but in reasoning—are 
unanimous ones.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 133, 134, 150 (1990) (a separate opinion “heightens the opinion writer’s incentive to 
‘get it right’”); see also CORLEY, supra note 7, at 11. 
82. See supra note 81. 
 83. Robbins, supra note 5, at 163–64.
84. Cf., e.g., Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An 
Uncomfortable Legality? 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 193–96 (2001) (assessing 
unpublished opinions’ effect on litigants’ right to due process and equal protection); Lance 
A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument Against 
Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 3 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2001). 
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written opinions,85 and are often not as carefully reasoned as 
published opinions.86 Similarly, the decision not to reach certain 
issues is almost never explained to the parties.87
Silent concurrences are surely flawed, and may impose 
significant costs on both the parties to an individual case and the 
legal system in general. But any unfavorable evaluation of this 
technique must account for the persistence of parallel techniques 
of negative agenda-setting that seem to pose similar cost/benefit 
ratios and yet remain deeply entrenched in judicial practices. So 
far, silent concurrences’ critics have failed to meet this burden. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Silent concurrences are a rare but stable feature of federal 
appellate judicial decisionmaking. Judges appear to use silent 
concurrences to allocate a scarce resource—judicial time—
among cases. Like other techniques of negative judicial agenda-
setting, the silent concurrence is not without flaws. But critics 
have not articulated any reason to believe that its cost/benefit 
ratio is worse than that applicable to other similar techniques 
like unpublished dispositions, or opinions that fail to resolve all 
issues presented in an appeal. Until they do, the silent 
concurrence should be accepted as a legitimate technique for 
appellate judges. 
85. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX A
To determine the number of silent concurrences, I screened 
the results of Westlaw searches for all published cases in the 
federal courts of appeals during the ten-year study period using 
“‘concur!’ /3 ‘judgment’” and “‘concur!’ /3 ‘result’” as search 
strategies.
I excluded all en banc cases. I also excluded any case in 
which there was a written explanation for the concurrence—
even if it consisted of just one sentence. I also excluded four 
cases in which the silent concurrence was explained by the 
death, illness, or retirement of a judge.88 I coded cases by the 
circuit in which the case was decided, not by the home circuit of 
the judge writing the silent concurrence. The list of cases—209 
in total—is included in Appendix B. 
I relied on data from the Federal Judicial Center tracking 
annual judicial workload by circuit and number of published 
opinions by circuit. These data are available by fiscal year so 
that the year “2007,” for instance, is the period from October 1, 
2006 through September 30, 2007. I used this convention 
throughout.
88. Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 621 n.* (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Honorable 
Betty Binns Fletcher, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, fully 
participated in the case and concurred in the judgment prior to her death.”); U.S. v. Chew, 
284 F.3d 468, 469 n.* (3d Cir. 2002) (“The Honorable Carol Los Mansmann participated 
in and concurred with the judgment in this case but died before the opinion could be 
filed.”); Horstmyer v. Black & Decker, Inc., 151 F.3d 765, 767 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1998) (“At 
the panel’s conference on January 22, 1998, following oral argument of the case, Judge 
Floyd R. Gibson concurred in the result reached in this opinion. Judge Gibson has been 
disabled by illness from reviewing the opinion, which is being filed in the interest of 
avoiding undue delay.”); Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 532 n.1 (8th Cir. 1998) (same, 
except for different conference date). 
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APPENDIX B
Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
U.S. v. Winnie 97 F.3d 975 7th 1996 Ripple
Lloyds of London v. Transcon. Gas Pipe 
Line Corp. 
101 F.3d 425 5th 1996 DeMoss 
Jackson v. Long 102 F.3d 722 4th 1996 Motz
United of Omaha v. Bus. Men’s Assur. 
Co. of Am. 
104 F.3d 1034 8th 1997 R. Arnold 
In re Cajun Elec. Power Co-op Inc. 109 F.3d 248 5th 1997 Stewart
Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union 114 F.3d 745 8th 1997 M. Arnold 
U.S. v. Grajales-Montoya 117 F.3d 356 8th 1997 Heaney 
Henderson v. Norris 118 F.3d 1283 8th 1997 Henley  
Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido 139 F.3d 659 9th 1997 Hawkins 
ACORN v. Miller 129 F.3d 833 6th 1997 Norris 
In re Firstmark Corp. 132 F.3d 1179 7th 1997 Rovner 
Olinger v. Larson 134 F.3d 1362 8th 1998 Heaney 
U.S. v. Pierce 136 F.3d 770 11th 1998 Black 
U.S. v. Brewster 137 F.3d 853 5th 1998 Stewart 
Northland Ins. Co. v. Guardsman Prods., 
Inc.
141 F.3d 612 6th 1998 Ryan 
U.S. v. Gomez-Gutierrez 140 F.3d 1287 9th  1998 Hawkins 
U.S. v. Stone 139 F.3d 822 11th 1998 Black89
Hindman v. Transkrit Corp. 145 F.3d 986 8th 1998 Loken 
 89. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Black “specially 
concurred and filed statement,” Stone, 139 F.3d at 822, her statement was essentially a 
silent concurrence, id. at 839 (“I concur in the result.”). 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Ramsey v. Bowersox 149 F.3d 749 8th 1998 Gibson 
Barber v. Johnson 145 F.3d 234 5th 1998 King 
Canales v. Roe 151 F.3d 1226 9th  1998 Rymer 
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
150 F.3d 526 5th 1998 Wiener
Webcor Packaging Corp. v. Autozone, Inc. 158 F.3d 354 6th 1998 Ryan90
In re Baker 154 F.3d 534 5th 1998 Wiener
Sea Servs. of the Keys, Inc. v. State of Fla. 156 F.3d 1151 11th 1998 Black 
Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc. 163 F.3d 1236 11th 1998 Edmonson 
Indest v. Freeman Decorating Inc. 164 F.3d 258 5th  1999 Furgeson91
NLRB v. Autodie Int’l, Inc. 169 F.3d 378 6th 1999 Norris 
U.S. v. Tex. Tech. Univ. 171 F.3d 279 5th 1999 Benavides 
Darst v. SSA 172 F.3d 1065 8th 1999 R. Arnold 
LeFevers v. Gibson 182 F.3d 705 10th  1999 Murphy 
Felder v. Johnson 180 F.3d 206 5th 1999 Dennis 
U.S. v. Soto-Holguin 163 F.3d 1217 10th  1999 Lucero 
Brown v. Perry 184 F.3d 388 4th 1999 Niemeyer 
Quartararo v. Hanslmaier 186 F.3d 91 2d 1999 Mishler 92
U.S. v. Rahal 191 F.3d 642 6th 1999 Ryan 
 90. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Ryan “delivered a 
separate concurring opinion,” Webcor, 158 F.3d at 354, his opinion was essentially a silent 
concurrence, id. at 361 (“I concur in the judgment of affirmance.”). 
 91. Judge William R. Furgeson, Jr., of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Texas. 
 92. Judge Jacob Mishler of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York. 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
U.S. v. Hill 195 F.3d 258 6th 1999 Boggs 
Ind. Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Timberland Pallet & Lumber Co., Inc. 
195 F.3d 368 8th  1999 Hansen 
Hicks v. Talbott Recovery Sys. 196 F.3d 1226 11th 1999 Bright
Alenco Commc’ns v. FCC 201 F.3d 608 5th  2000 Wiener 
Vanderhurst v. Co. Mtn. Coll. Dist. 208 F.3d 908 10th 2000 Reavley 
Richardson v. Klaesson 210 F.3d 811 8th  2000 Hansen 
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke 211 F.3d 638 D.C.  2000 Henderson 
U.S. v. Hawkins 215 F.3d 858 8th  2000 Gibson 
Kadonsky v. U.S. 216 F.3d 499 5th 2000 Stewart
U.S. v. Beckman 222 F.3d 512 8th  2000 Beam 
Williamson v. Moore 221 F.3d 1177 11th 2000 Birch
Fabry v. Comm’r 223 F.3d 1261 11th  2000 Black 
U.S. v. Martinez 228 F.3d 587 5th 2000 Stewart
Kia P. v. McIntyre 235 F.3d 749 2d  2000 Van Graafeiland 
U.S. v. Jones 235 F.3d 1231 10th 2000 Baldock93
Bronaugh v. Ohio 235 F.3d 280 6th  2000 Matia94
U.S. v. Pratt 239 F.3d 640 4th 2001 Widener95
 93. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that “Babcock, Circuit Judge, 
concurred in result,” Jones, 235 F.3d at 1232, the silent concurrer was Judge Baldock, id.
(“Before Baldock, Ebel and Lucero, Circuit Judges.”).  
 94. Judge Paul R. Matia of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio. 
 95. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Widener “filed 
opinion concurring in result,” Pratt, 239 F.3d at 641, his opinion was essentially a silent 
concurrence, id. at 648 (“I concur in the result.”). 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
U.S. v. Ben Zvi 242 F.3d 89 2d 2001 Van Graafeiland 
U.S. v. Gilbert 244 F.3d 888 11th  2001 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Gallego 247 F.3d 1191 11th 2001 Hill 
U.S. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop. 248 F.3d 781 8th  2001 Beam 
U.S. v. Chubbuck 252 F.3d 1300 11th 2001 Edmonson 
Culpepper v. Irwin Mortg. Corp. 253 F.3d 1324 11th  2001 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Riggans 254 F.3d 1200 10th 2001 Lucero 
U.S. v. Rousseau 257 F.3d 925 9th  2001 Rawlinson 
U.S. v. Humber 255 F.3d 1308 11th 2001 Edmonson 
Dils v. Small 260 F.3d 984 9th  2001 Pregerson96
U.S. v. Baptiste 264 F.3d 578 5th 2001 Reavley 
Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 
West
267 F.3d 821 8th  2001 Loken 
Deere & Co. v. Johnson 271 F.3d 613 5th 2001 King 
U.S. v. Smith 273 F.3d 629 5th  2001 Benavides 
Cent. Pines Land Co. v. U.S. 274 F.3d 881 5th 2001 Stewart
U.S. v. Prentiss 273 F.3d 1277 10th  2001 Baldock 
Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att’y Gen. 275 F.3d 1334 11th 2001 Barkett
Oliver v. Scott 276 F.3d 736 5th  2002 Garza 
U.S. v. Nolasco-Rosas 286 F.3d 762 5th 2002 Jones
 96. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Pregerson “filed 
specially concurring opinion” Dils, 260 F.3d at 985, his opinion was essentially a silent 
concurrence, id. at 987 (“I concur in the result.”). 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
U.S. v. Serna 309 F.3d 859 5th 2002 DeMoss 
Salinas v. O’Neill 286 F.3d 827 5th  2002 DeMoss 
Blue v. Cockrell 298 F.3d 318 5th 2002 Stewart
Summum v. City of Ogden 297 F.3d 995 10th  2002 Oberdorfer97
U.S. v. Kapelshnik 306 F.3d 1090 11th 2002 Edmonson 
Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, 
Leeds & Kellogg Corp. 
305 F.3d 1293 11th  2002 Black 
Hussain v. Bos. Old Colony Ins. Co. 311 F.3d 623 5th 2002 Garza 
U.S. v. $242,484.00 318 F.3d 1240 11th  2003 Pogue98
Morris v. Burnett 319 F.3d 1254 10th 2003 McWilliams 
U.S. v. Graham 327 F.3d 460 6th  2003 Cohn99
Murphy v. Cockrell 330 F.3d 353 5th 2003 Wiener
Eide v. Grey Fox Technical Servs. Corp. 329 F.3d 600 8th  2003 Loken 
Glassroth v. Moore 335 F.3d 1282 11th 2003 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Vigil 334 F.3d 1215 10th  2003 O'Brien 
Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. 
Manatee Cnty. 
337 F.3d 1251 11th 2003 Edmonson 
Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber 
Corp.
343 F.3d 719 5th  2003 Reavley 
Cherrington v. Skeeter 344 F.3d 631 6th 2003 Moore
U.S. v. Nelson 347 F.3d 701 8th  2003 Bright 
 97. Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.
 98. Judge Donald C. Pogue of the United States Court of International Trade. 
 99. Judge Avern L. Cohn of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan.
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City 
of Clearwater 
351 F.3d 1112 11th  2003 Anderson 
Modern Equipment Co. v. Cont’l W. Ins. 
Co., Inc. 
355 F.3d 1125 8th 2004 Bright
Coalition for Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. 
Prison Indus., Inc. 
365 F.3d 435 6th  2004 Gibbons 
U.S. v. Gabriel 365 F.3d 29 D.C.  2004 Henderson 
Nguyen v. Ashcroft 366 F.3d 386 5th  2004 Jones 
Williams v. BellSouth Telecommc’ns, Inc. 373 F.3d 1132 11th 2004 Edmonson 
Carr v. Schofield 364 F.3d 1246 11th  2004 Edmonson 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. 380 F.3d 219 5th 2004 Garza 
AmSouth Bank v. Dale 386 F.3d 763 6th  2004 Boggs 
U.S. v. Washington 387 F.3d 1060 9th 2004 Beam 
Seay Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Mary 
Esther
397 F.3d 943 11th  2005 Edmonson 
Jennings v. Wentzville R-IV Sch. Dist. 397 F.3d 1118 8th 2005 Gibson100
Blades v. Monsanto Co. 400 F.3d 562 8th  2005 M. Arnold 
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios 402 F.3d 1148 11th 2005 Anderson 
U.S. v. Haidley 400 F.3d 642 8th  2005 Heaney 
Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet 405 F.3d 964 11th 2005 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Bartram 407 F.3d 307 4th  2005 Gregory 
U.S. v. Crawford 407 F.3d 1174 11th 2005 Edmonson 
 100. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Gibson “concurred 
specially and filed opinion” Jennings, 397 F.3d at 1119, his opinion was essentially a silent 
concurrence, id. at 1125 (“I concur in the result and in the judgment.”) 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 410 F.3d 1275 11th 2005 Edmonson 
Vasha v. Gonzalez 410 F.3d 863 6th  2005 Adams101
In re Conklin 416 F.3d 1281 11th 2005 Edmonson 
New Wellington Fin. Corp. v. Flagship 
Resort Dev. Corp. 
416 F.3d 290 4th  2005 Motz 
Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzalez 418 F.3d 1050 9th 2005 Farris
U.S. v. Resendiz-Patino 420 F.3d 1177 10th  2005 Lucero 
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer 425 F.3d 836 10th 2005 Porfilio 
Anderson v. Att’y Gen. of Kan. 425 F.3d 853 10th  2005 Porfilio 
Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga. 406 F.3d 1307 11th 2005 Cox 
U.S. v. Walker 428 F.3d 1165 8th  2005 Bright 
ACLU of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty. 432 F.3d 624 6th 2005 Rice102
Nelson v. Dretke 442 F.3d 282 5th  2006 Stewart 
U.S. v. Dulcio 441 F.3d 1269 11th 2006 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Brown 441 F.3d 1330 11th  2006 Barkett 
Willis v. Coca Cola Enters. Inc. 445 F.3d 413 5th 2006 Reavley 
U.S. v. Salazar 443 F.3d 1153 9th  2006 Rawlinson 
U.S. v. Maxwell 446 F.3d 1210 11th 2006 Edmonson 
Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange 447 F.3d 673 9th  2006 Farris 
Sylvester v. Fogley 465 F.3d 851 8th 2006 Loken 
 101. Judge John R. Adams of the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Ohio. 
 102. Judge Walter H. Rice of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio. 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Adams v. Groesbeck Indep. Sch. Dist. 475 F.3d 688 5th 2007 Stewart
U.S. v. Hubbard 480 F.3d 341 5th  2007 Garza 
Teague v. Quarterman 482 F.3d 769 5th 2007 Clement
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Knox Park Constr., 
Inc.
488 F.3d 680 5th  2007 Wiener 
Nwogu v. Gonzalez 491 F.3d 80 2d 2007 Winter103
Epps v. Watson 492 F.3d 1240 11th  2007 Edmonson 
Watson v. U.S. 493 F.3d 960 8th 2007 Beam 
Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 494 F.3d 956 11th  2007 Edmonson 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Ct. of 
Spirit Lake Indian Reservation 
495 F.3d 1017 8th 2007 Beam 
Arthur v. King 500 F.3d 1335 11th  2007 Barkett104
Smith v. Allen 502 F.3d 1255 11th 2007 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Morgan 505 F.3d 332 5th  2007 Dennis 
U.S. v. Escareno Sanchez 507 F.3d 877 5th 2007 Stewart
U.S. v. Ronquillo 508 F.3d 744 5th  2007 Reavley 
U.S. v. Mumma 509 F.3d 1239 10th 2007 Murphy 
Hepp v. Astrue 511 F.3d 798 8th  2008 Beam 
Pielage v. McConnell 516 F.3d 1282 11th 2008 Edmonson 
 103. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Winter “concurs in a 
separate opinion,” Nwogu, 491 F.3d at 80, his opinion was essentially a silent concurrence, 
id. at 83 (“I concur in the judgment.”). 
 104.  Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Barkett “filed 
opinion concurring in the result,” Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1335, her opinion was essentially a 
silent concurrence, id. at 1344 (“I agree that Arthur is not legally entitled to relief on this 
claim.”).
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc. 518 F.3d 1259 11th 2008 Edmonson 
Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co. 523 F.3d 934 9th  2008 Archer105
In re Subpoena In Collins 524 F.3d 249 D.C.  2008 Henderson 
Urban Hotel Dev. Co., Inc. v. President 
Dev. Grp., L.C. 
535 F.3d 874 8th  2008 Bright 
U.S. v. Davis 538 F.3d 914 8th 2008 Hansen 
Wood v. RIH Acquisitions MS II, LLC 556 F.3d 274 5th  2009 Haynes 
U.S. v. Mondragon-Santiago 564 F.3d 357 5th 2009 King
Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex. 564 F.3d 379 5th  2009 Stewart 
Parker v. Allen 565 F.3d 1258 11th 2009 Edmonson 
Fautenberry v. Mitchell 571 F.3d 1341 6th  2009 Moore 
Ovalles v. Holder 577 F.3d 288 5th 2009 Haynes 
U.S. v. Hopkins 577 F.3d 507 3d  2009 Sloviter 
Mushtaq v. Holder 583 F.3d 875 5th 2009 Dennis 
Qwest Corp. v. Boyle 589 F.3d 985 8th  2009 Hansen 
Ward v. Hall 592 F.3d 1144 11th 2010 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Palmera Pineda 592 F.3d 199 D.C.  2010 Henderson 
Kleinman v. City of San Marcos 597 F.3d 323 5th 2010 Haynes 
Simms v. Acevedo 595 F.3d 774 7th  2010 Cudahy 
U.S. v. Scroggins 599 F.3d 433 5th 2010 Dennis 
Raby v. Livingston 600 F.3d 552 5th  2010 Stewart 
 105. Judge Glenn L. Archer of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Durr v. Cordray 602 F.3d 731 6th  2010 Cole 
Green v. DEA 606 F.3d 1296 11th 2010 Edmonson 
Sherman v. Lamothe 608 F.3d 212 5th  2010 DeMoss 
DeYoung v. Schofield 609 F.3d 1260 11th 2010 Edmonson 
St. Marks Place Hous. Co., Inc. v. HUD 610 F.3d 75 D.C.  2010 Henderson 
Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. 611 F.3d 740 11th 2010 Wilson
U.S. v. Samuels 611 F.3d 914 8th  2010 Loken 
ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA 612 F.3d 822 5th 2010 Jolly 
Leal v. Sec’y, HHS 620 F.3d 1280 11th  2010 Edmonson 
Gulf Coast Shell & Aggregate LP v. 
Newlin 
623 F.3d 235 5th 2010 Dennis 
Wiley v. Epps 625 F.3d 199 5th  2010 Jolly 
Deltoro-Aguilera v. U.S. 625 F.3d 434 8th 2010 Wollman
U.S. v. McCullough 631 F.3d 783 5th  2011 Wiener 
Lefaivre v. KV Pharm. Co.  636 F.3d 935 8th 2011 Beam 
Cave v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr. 638 F.3d 739 11th  2011 Edmonson 
U.S. v. Garcia 655 F.3d 426 5th 2011 Haynes 
U.S. v. Moreno-Gonzalez 662 F.3d 369 5th  2011 Wiener 
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs 
663 F.3d 470 D.C.  2011 Henderson 
Turner v. Ks. City S. Ry. Co. 675 F.3d 887 5th  2012 Southwick 
Luminant Generation Co., LLC v. EPA 675 F.3d 917 5th 2012 Garza 
Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan 
v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc. 
677 F.3d 720 5th  2012 Graves 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo 
Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs 
692 F.3d 343 5th  2012 Stewart 
U.S. v. Stepp 680 F.3d 651 6th 2012 Boggs 
U.S. v. Ford 683 F.3d 761 7th  2012 Tinder 
U.S. v. Serfass 684 F.3d 548 5th 2012 Graves 
U.S. v. Receskey 699 F.3d 807 5th  2012 Haynes 
U.S. v. Quiroga-Hernandez 698 F.3d 227 5th 2012 Graves 
Divers v. Cain 698 F.3d 211 5th  2012 Stewart 
Tekelec, Inc. v. Verint Sys., Inc. 708 F.3d 658 5th 2013 Haynes 
U.S. v. Black 707 F.3d 531 4th  2013 Traxler 
Classic Concepts, Inc. v. Linen Source, 
Inc.
716 F.3d 1282 9th 2013 Reinhardt
U.S. v. Alvarado-Casas 715 F.3d 945 5th  2013 Graves 
Goodman v. Kimbrough 718 F.3d 1325 11th 2013 Cox106
Jasinski v. Tyler 729 F.3d 531  6th  2013 Gilman 
Dash v. Mayweather 731 F.3d 303 4th 2013 Davis 
Puiatti v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. 732 F.3d 1255 11th  2013 Martin 
Bradberry v. Jefferson Cnty. Tex. 732 F.3d 540 5th 2013 Haynes 
Ritchie v. U.S. 733 F.3d 871 9th  2013 Farris 
Farah v. Esquire Magazine 736 F.3d 528 D.C.  2013 Brown 
U.S. v. Herrera-Alvarez 753 F.3d 132 5th  2014 Garza 
 106. Although the West version of the opinion indicates that Judge Cox “filed specially 
concurring opinion,” Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1326, his opinion was essentially a silent 
concurrence, id. at 1336 (“I do not join Judge Wilson’s opinion, but I concur in the 
result.”). 
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Case Reporter Court Year Silent Judge 
Kagan v. City of New Orleans 753 F.3d 560 5th  2014 Jones 
DHS v. FLRA 751 F.3d 665 D.C.  2014 Henderson 
Stop this Insanity Inc. Emp. Leadership 
Fund v. FEC 
761 F.3d 10 D.C.  2014 Sentelle 
Wood v. Crane Co. 764 F.3d 316 4th 2014 Duncan 
Guyton v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 767 F.3d 754 8th  2014 Beam 
